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Abstract
We consider the problem of sharing water among agents located along a river. Each agent
has quasi-linear preferences over river water and money, where the benefit of consuming an
amount of water is given by a continuous and concave benefit function. A solution to the
problem efficiently distributes the river water over the agents and wastes no money. We
introduce a number of (independence) axioms to characterize two new and two existing
solutions. We apply the solutions to the particular case that every agent has constant
marginal benefit of one up to a satiation point and marginal benefit of zero thereafter. In
this case we find that two of the solutions (one existing and one new) can be implemented
without monetary transfers between the agents.
Keywords: Water allocation, Harmon doctrine, concave benefit function, stability, exter-
nality, independence axiom, water claim.
JEL codes: C71, D62, Q25
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water among agents, e.g. countries, cities,
firms, located along a river. As the number of agents involved in sharing (international)
river water is usually small, and formal (international) water exchanges are scarce, trade in
river water normally takes place by the signing of contracts between the parties involved.
These contracts directly specify the amount of water to be delivered and the amount
of money that has to be paid for this water, see Dinar, Rosegrant and Meinzen-Dick
(1997) and its references. Cooperative game theory deals with strategic situations in which
the outcome of one agent’s choice depends on choices made by other agents, and the
agents making the choices are able to sign binding bi- or multilateral contracts to enforce
cooperation. For this reason cooperative game theory is one of the main tools that is
used in modeling (international) water resource issues, see Parrachino, Dinar and Patrone
(2006) for an overview.
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) introduce a model in which a group of agents is located
along a single-stream river from upstream to downstream. Each agent is assumed to
have quasi-linear preferences over river water and money, where the benefit of consuming
an amount of water is given by a differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave
benefit function. An allocation of the river water among the agents is efficient when it
maximizes the total sum of benefits. To sustain an efficient water allocation, the agents can
compensate each other by paying monetary transfers. Every water allocation and transfer
schedule yields a welfare distribution, where the utility of an agent is equal to its benefit
from water consumption plus its monetary transfer, which can be negative. By deriving a
cooperative game from their model, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) find out how the river
water should be allocated over the agents and propose what monetary transfers should
be performed in order to realize a fair welfare distribution. They suggest the downstream
incremental solution as a welfare distribution that satisfies both core lower bounds as well
as aspiration upper bounds. This downstream incremental solution can be seen as the
marginal contribution vector of their cooperative game corresponding to the ordering of
agents along the river, from upstream to downstream.
Ambec and Ehlers (2008), Khmelnitskaya (2010), van den Brink, van der Laan and
Moes (2010) and Wang (2011) all generalize the model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
in a specific way. Ambec and Ehlers (2008) allow for satiable agents by assuming that
the benefit function of each agent is differentiable and strictly concave, but not necessar-
ily increasing (i.e., the benefit function can be decreasing beyond some satiation point).
Khmelnitskaya (2010) considers rivers that have a so-called sink-tree or rooted-tree struc-
ture allowing multiple springs or deltas. Van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2010)
study rivers with multiple springs (as in Khmelnitskaya (2010)) and satiable agents (as in
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Ambec and Ehlers (2008)) and suggest a new class of solutions based on a water distribu-
tion principle known as Territorial Integration of all Basin States (TIBS). Finally, Wang
(2011) proposes a solution to the original single-stream model in which water trading is
restricted to pairs of neighboring agents.
Our paper adds to this growing literature in three ways. First, we weaken the as-
sumption of Ambec and Ehlers (2008) (and therefore also the assumption of Ambec and
Sprumont (2002)) on the benefit functions by only requiring continuity and concavity.
Second, we characterize two existing solutions for the single-stream model by introducing
several (independence) axioms. Third, we propose and characterize two new solutions for
the single-stream model, also by using new (independence) axioms.
In contrast to the papers mentioned above, in this paper we avoid the detour of modeling
the river situation as a cooperative game. Instead, we immediately impose axioms on the
class of all river water sharing problems. This has as main advantage that the axioms
we propose can directly be interpreted in terms of water (benefit) allocation. While most
axioms used in the literature are also derived from water distribution principles, they are
ultimately axioms on cooperative games and not on water allocation problems. This often
leads to friction when trying to interpret the cooperative game axioms in terms of water
allocation. We feel that our approach is more natural as it allows for a straightforward
interpretation of the axioms.
After considering the general case, we apply the four solutions that we discuss in this
paper to the particular case that every agent has constant marginal benefit of one up to
a satiation point, and marginal benefit of zero thereafter, see also Ansink and Weikard
(2011). This could be seen as representing a situation where the full benefit functions of
the agents are unknown and each agent has only specified a single claim on water from
the river. We find that in this case two of the solutions (one existing and one new) can be
implemented without monetary transfers between the agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the single-stream river sharing
model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and weaken the assumptions on the benefit functions
of that model. In Section 3 we introduce a number of axioms on river sharing problems. In
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 we show that different sets of axioms characterize different solutions
assiging fair welfare distributions to every river problem. More specifically, we characterize
two existing solutions, known as the downstream incremental solution (Section 4) and the
upstream incremental solution (Section 5), and propose and characterize two new solutions:
the downstream solution (Section 6) and the upstream solution (Section 7). In Section 8
we apply the four solutions to the case where every agent has constant marginal benefit of
one up to a satiation point, and marginal benefit of zero thereafter. We conclude with a
comparison of the four solutions in Section 9.
2
2 River problems with concave benefit functions
In their paper ‘Sharing a river’, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) consider the problem of
finding a ‘fair’ distribution of the welfare resulting from allocating the inflows of water
along an international or transboundary river to the agents located along the river. Let
N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents, in the sequel also called countries, along the river,
numbered successively from upstream to downstream, and let ei ≥ 0 be the inflow of water
on the territory of agent i, i = 1, . . . , n. Every agent i is assumed to have a quasi-linear
utility function assigning to every pair (xi, ti) with xi ∈ IR+ an amount of water allocated
to i and ti ∈ IR a monetary compensation to i, the utility
νi(xi, ti) = bi(xi) + ti, (2.1)
where bi: IR+ → IR is a continuous function yielding benefit bi(xi) to agent i of the consump-
tion xi of water. In the following we denote such a river situation by the triple (N, e, b),
where N is the set of agents, e ∈ IRn+ is the vector of nonnegative inflows and b = (bi)i∈N
is the collection of benefit functions.
Because of the one-directionality of the water flow from upstream to downstream, every
agent can be assigned at most the water inflow at the territories of himself and his upstream
agents, but the water inflow downstream of some agent cannot be allocated to this agent.
Therefore, a water allocation x ∈ IRn+ assigns an amount of water xi to agent i, i = 1, . . . , n,
under the constraints
j∑
i=1
xi ≤
j∑
i=1
ei, j = 1, . . . , n,
i.e., x ∈ IRn+ is a water allocation if, for every agent j, the sum of the water assignments
x1, . . . , xj is at most equal to the sum of the inflows e1, . . . , ej. A water allocation x
yields total welfare
∑n
i=1 bi(xi). We allow for monetary transfers amongst the agents,
so that agents can make monetary compensations to other agents for receiving water. A
compensation scheme t ∈ IRn gives a monetary compensation ti to agent i, i = 1, . . . , n,
under the constraint
n∑
i=1
ti ≤ 0.
As mentioned before, a pair (x, t) of a water allocation x and a compensation scheme t
yields utilities νi(xi, ti) given by (2.1) for every i = 1, . . . , n. A pair (x, t) is Pareto efficient
if no water and no money is wasted, i.e., (x, t) is Pareto efficient if and only if x ∈ IRn+
maximizes the welfare maximization problem
max
x1,...,xn
n∑
i=1
bi(xi) s.t.
j∑
i=1
xi ≤
j∑
i=1
ei, j = 1, . . . , n, and xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n, (2.2)
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and the compensation scheme t ∈ IRn+ is budget balanced:
∑n
i=1 ti = 0.
In Ambec and Sprumont (2002) it is assumed that every benefit function bi: IR+ → IR
is an increasing and strictly concave function, which is differentiable at every xi > 0 with
derivative going to infinity as xi tends to zero. Under this assumption the maximization
problem (2.2) has a unique solution x∗. We say that z ∈ IRn is a welfare distribution if
there exists a Pareto efficient pair (x∗, t) such that
zi = bi(x
∗
i ) + ti, i = 1, . . . , n.
Hence, a welfare distribution z distributes the maximum attainable welfare
∑n
i=1 b(x
∗
i )
amongst the agents by allocating x∗i to agent i, i = 1, . . . , n, and implementing a bud-
get balanced monetary compensation scheme t. Reversely, notice that for the optimal
allocation x∗ every budget balanced compensation scheme t induces a welfare distribution.
In Ambec and Sprumont (2002) the problem to find a ‘fair’ budget balanced com-
pensation scheme, or equivalently a fair welfare distribution, is modeled by a cooperative
transferable utility game. Then a solution for the cooperative game is proposed by taking
into account two principles for a fair welfare distribution given in Kilgour and Dinar (1995).
The principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) states that every country has unre-
stricted access to use its own natural resources. For an international river this leads to the
Harmon doctrine, stating that a country is absolutely sovereign over the inflow to the river
on its own territory and thus every agent is the legal owner of its own water inflow. This
principle favors upstream countries by implying that, for every j = 1, . . . , n, the coalition
{1, . . . , j} of the first j upstream countries are entitled to use the total inflow of water on
their own territories without taking into account what consequences this might have for
the downstream countries. In contrast to this, the principle of Territorial Integration of
all Basin States (TIBS) favors downstream countries by stating that all the water inflows
belong to all the countries together, no matter where it enters the river. It makes all coun-
tries together the legal owner of all water inflows, without regard to their own contribution
to the flow. Taking the one-directionality of the water flows from upstream to downstream
into account, an interpretation of the TIBS principle is the principle of Unlimited Territo-
rial Integrity (UTI), stating that unrestricted use by a country of its own natural resources
is only permitted in so far it does not cause damage to other sovereign countries. In its
extreme form this principle implies that a country j is entitled to use all the water inflows
on its own territory and on the territories of all its upstream countries. Of course, this
leads to conflicting situations in the sense that the inflow ei at the territory of country i is
entitled to every country j ≥ i.
As argued by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), the Harmon doctrine implies stability
in the sense that for every i and every j ≥ i the total welfare that the collection of
consecutive countries {i, i + 1, . . . , j} receives at a Pareto efficient pair (x∗, t) should be
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at least equal to the sum of benefits that these countries can guarantee themselves by an
optimal (welfare maximizing) allocation of their own inflows ei, . . . , ej amongst themselves.
1
In case j = i this stability notion reduces to individual rationality, saying that the payoff
of a country i should be at least equal to the benefit bi(ei) of the water inflow on its own
territory.2 Taking i = 1 and j ≥ i, stability implies upstream stability, meaning that for
every upstream collection of consecutive countries {1, . . . , j}, j = 1, . . . , n, that the total
welfare
∑j
i=1 zi of the first j upstream countries at a Pareto efficient pair (x
∗, t) should be
at least equal to the maximum that these countries can guarantee themselves by solving
the welfare maximization problem
max
x1,...,xj
j∑
i=1
bi(xi) s.t.
k∑
i=1
xi ≤
k∑
i=1
ei, k = 1, . . . , j, and xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , j. (2.3)
Under the assumptions made on the benefit functions in Ambec and Sprumont (2002),
for each j this maximization problem has a unique solution. We denote this solution by
xj = (xj1, . . . , x
j
j) and the corresponding total welfare by v
j =
∑j
i=1 bi(x
j
i ). Notice that
xni = x
∗
i , i = 1, . . . , n, and v
n =
∑n
i=1 bi(x
∗
i ). It follows that upstream stability requires
that
∑j
i=1 zi ≥ vj for every j = 1, . . . , n.
On the other hand, based on the UTI principle favoring the downstream coun-
tries, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) impose the condition that for every upstream coalition
{1, . . . , j}, j = 1, . . . , n, the total welfare of these countries is bounded from above by their
aspiration level, being the maximum welfare they can obtain by distributing their own
water optimally amongst themselves. Thus, the aspiration level property requires that for
each j the total welfare
∑j
i=1 zi of the first j upstream countries is at most equal to the
welfare obtained from solving the welfare maximization problem (2.3), i.e.,
∑j
i=1 zi ≤ vj
for every j = 1, . . . , n. It follows that the upstream stability requirement and the aspira-
tion level property together require that
∑j
i=1 zi = v
j for every j = 1, . . . , n, and thus
determine the unique welfare distribution zi = v
i − vi−1, i = 1, . . . , n, with v0 defined to
be equal to zero. The corresponding so-called downstream incremental solution assigns to
every river problem (N, e, b), the welfare distribution d(N, e, b) ∈ IRn given by
di(N, e, b) = v
i − vi−1, i = 1, . . . , n. (2.4)
Although this welfare distribution is fully determined by the upstream stability requirement
and the aspiration level property, it is also stable for every coalition {i, i + 1, . . . , j}, 1 ≤
i ≤ j ≤ n, of consecutive agents.
1Within the game-theoretic model of Ambec and Sprumont this equals the well-known notion of Core
stability.
2Notice that this notion of individual rationality only holds under the assumption that a country is the
legal owner of its own inflow.
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Ambec and Ehlers (2008) generalized the basic river game described above by al-
lowing for satiable agents. This means that they weaken the assumption on the benefits
in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) by deleting the requirement that the benefit function is
strictly increasing. They assume that every benefit function bi: IR+ → IR is a strictly con-
cave function, differentiable at every xi > 0 with derivative going to infinity as xi tends to
zero. Under this assumption it is possible that for some point ci > 0, called the satiation
point of agent i, the benefit is increasing from xi = 0 to ci, reaches its maximum value
at ci, and is decreasing for xi > ci. The existence of satiation points has serious conse-
quences for the corresponding cooperative game. Without satiation points, only coalitions
of consecutive agents are able to cooperate in order to maximize their joint welfare by
allocating optimally their own water inflows amongst each other (under the Absolute Ter-
ritorial Sovereignty (ATS) assumption, saying that the agents in each coalition have the
rights to use their own water inflows). A non-consecutive coalition of two (consecutive)
subsets of agents would never transfer water from the upstream part to the downstream
part, because the increasing benefit functions would make that all water sent from the
upstream agents to the downstream agents would be taken by the agents in-between the
two parts. In contrast, under the weaker assumption of Ambec and Ehlers (2008), it might
be profitable for a non-consecutive coalition of agents to transfer water from its upstream
part to its downstream part when all agents in-between have a satiation point. Although
some of this flow might be taken by the in-between agents, these agents will only take
water up to their satiation points. When the flow is big enough, part of it will reach the
downstream agents, possibly rendering cooperation between the two parts of the coalition
profitable. This phenomenon might cause positive externalities on the agents in-between
two parts of a non-consecutive coalition. As a result, in the corresponding cooperative
game the worth that can be obtained by a coalition depends on the behavior of the other
agents, leading to a more complicated model, a so-called game in partition function form.
However, it is clear that for every j, the upstream coalition {1, . . . , j} is externality free,
i.e., the maximum welfare that such a coalition can obtain by allocating their own wa-
ter inflows optimally amongst themselves does not depend on the behavior of the agents
after j, and these maximum welfare levels are still given by the values vj, j = 1, . . . , n,
at the solutions of the welfare maximization problems (2.3). Therefore, the downstream
incremental solution d(N, e, b) is still well-defined for river problems (N, e, b) with satiation
points, and in Ambec and Ehlers (2008) it is shown that also for river situations with sa-
tiable agents this solution is uniquely determined by requiring upstream stability and the
aspiration level property. Although they model the river problem with satiable agents by
a game in partition function form, eventually they characterize a solution which only uses
the welfare levels that can be obtained by consecutive coalitions containing agent 1, and
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these levels are externality free. Under the assumption that ei ≤ ci for every i, the solution
is also stable for every coalition {i, i+ 1, . . . , j}, 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, of consecutive agents.
In this paper we further weaken the assumptions of Ambec and Ehlers (2008), and
therefore also those of Ambec and Sprumont (2002), by allowing the benefit functions to
be concave instead of strictly concave. Moreover, we weaken differentiability to continuity.
Assumption 2.1 In a river situation (N, e, b), every benefit function bi: IR+ → IR is con-
cave and continuous for xi > 0.
The assumption says that bi may be nondecreasing, but also allows that there may
exist an interval [ci, c
i], ci ≥ ci, such that bi is increasing on xi < ci, constant on xi ∈ [ci, ci],
and decreasing when xi > c
i. In the latter case the point ci is the satiation point of agent
i. Agent i reaches its highest benefit at ci. All water consumption levels between ci and
ci also yield this maximal benefit, but water consumption higher than ci yields a lower
benefit. We allow for ci = 0 and c
i = ∞ (meaning that bi is constant for xi ≥ ci ≥ 0). In
particular this allows for bi(xi) = bi(0) for every xi ≥ 0.
Under Assumption 2.1, the maximization problems (2.3) do not necessarily have a
unique solution, but are still well-defined. Let Xj be the set of solutions of the welfare
maximization problem (2.3) for country j, j = 1, . . . , n, under Assumption 2.1. Then, for
every solution xj ∈ Xj we have that vj = ∑ji=1 bi(xji ) and for every xn ∈ Xn, the budget
balanced pair (xn, t) yields a welfare distribution
zi = bi(x
n
i ) + ti, i = 1, . . . , n,
with sum of payoffs equal to the Pareto efficient total welfare vn =
∑n
i=1 bi(x
n
i ).
Under Assumption 2.1, the corresponding cooperative game is not well defined un-
less we make additional assumptions on the water consumption of agents that have concave,
but not strictly concave, benefit functions. Consider again a non-consecutive coalition con-
sisting of a consecutive upstream part and a consecutive downstream part. If some agent
j between these two parts has a benefit function with a satiation point cj and a point
cj > cj such that its benefit is constant between cj and c
j and decreasing thereafter, then
the cooperative game is not well-defined without an additional assumption about the water
consumption of agent j in case the water flow sent by the upstream part to the downstream
part becomes so big that the availability of water for agent j exceeds his satiation point
cj. Instead of making such an assumption, in the following sections we will impose axioms
directly on the river situation (N, e, b) and we derive from these axioms unique solutions
for the welfare distribution problem without modeling the river situation as a cooperative
game. Doing so, we do not need such an additional assumption.
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3 Axioms for fair welfare distribution
In this section we formulate axioms concerning the distribution of welfare in river situations
(N, e, b), where the preferences of the agents over water are described by benefit functions
satisfying Assumption 2.1. Let WN denote the collection of all river situations (N, e, b)
satisfying Assumption 2.1. Then a solution is a function f assigning to every (N, e, b) ∈ WN
a welfare distribution f(N, e, b) ∈ IRn. In the sequel, the component fi(N, e, b) is called
the payoff of agent i, i = 1, . . . , n. Notice that the welfare levels depend on the inflow
vector e and the set of benefit functions b. Therefore, in the following we denote for every
j the maximum welfare level obtained by solving the welfare maximization problem (2.3)
by vj(e, b) instead of just vj.
As we have seen before, stability reflects the Harmon principle that each agent is
the legal owner of its own water, and therefore stability puts a severe requirement on the
welfare distribution. In particular, upstream stability may contradict the TIBS principle
that each inflow belongs to all agents together. It certainly is conflicting with the UTI
interpretation of the TIBS principle stating that every agent has the right to use the total
inflow of himself and all his upstream agents. Therefore, one might argue that stability is
too strong. In the next two axioms we weaken the stability requirement. The efficiency
axiom only requires stability for the coalition of all agents and states that the total sum of
payoffs equals the total welfare vn(e, b) in an optimal water allocation.
As noticed before, for individual agents stability yields individual rationality, saying
that an agent gets at least a payoff equal to the highest benefit that can be obtained by
consuming at most its own water inflow (this reflects that every agent is the owner of its
own inflow). Under Assumption 2.1 this benefit is at least equal to the benefit of consuming
a zero amount of water. The lower bound property axiom weakens individual rationality
by only requiring that each agent gets at least a payoff equal to the benefit of consuming
a zero amount of water.
Axiom 3.1 (Efficiency) For every river problem (N, e, b) we have that
∑
i∈N fi(N, e, b) =
vn(e, b).
Axiom 3.2 (Lower bound property) For every river problem (N, e, b) we have that
fi(N, e, b) ≥ bi(0) for all i ∈ N .
As mentioned before, the aspiration level property reflects the UTI principle, but
also utilizes this principle to put an upper bound on the total payoff to the members of
all upstream coalitions {1, . . . , j}, j = 1, . . . , n, by stating that the total payoff to such a
coalition is at most equal to the highest total benefit it can obtain by allocating at most
their own water inflows amongst themselves. By this requirement it is a priori excluded
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that the total monetary compensation to an upstream coalition is more than what is needed
to compensate the agents in the coalition for their loss of total benefit by allocating some
of their inflow to their downstream agents. Consequently, all benefits from allocating all
inflows optimally over all agents go to the downstream agents. One might wonder why a
coalition of upstream agents agrees with such an optimal allocation if their total payoff
is at most equal to what they can get by consuming all the water by themselves. In the
next two axioms we weaken the aspiration level property in two different ways. In the first
axiom, called the drought property, the aspiration level property is only required for an
upstream coalition if the total water inflow of the coalition is zero. In the second axiom
the aspiration level property is weakened in a way that a coalition of upstream agents can
benefit from allocating some of their inflows to downstream agents. This weak aspiration
level property requires that no agent earns a higher payoff as its utility when it has access
to all the water inflow, that is its own inflow plus all upstream and downstream water
inflows.
Axiom 3.3 (Drought property) For every river problem (N, e, b) with ej = 0 for all
j ≤ i, we have that fi(N, e, b) ≤ bi(0).
Axiom 3.4 (Weak aspiration level property) For every river problem (N, e, b), we
have that fi(N, e, b) ≤ maxxi≤∑j∈N ej bi(xi) for all i ∈ N .3
A more severe axiom than the drought property is the no contribution property. It
states that an agent with zero inflow of water on his territory should get at most a payoff
equal to its benefit of zero water consumption.
Axiom 3.5 (No contribution property) For every river problem (N, e, b) and i ∈ N
with ei = 0 we have that fi(N, e, b) ≤ bi(0).
Next we state several independence axioms. The first one states that the payoff of
an agent does not depend on the benefit functions of its downstream agents, the second one
states that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the benefit functions of its upstream
agents.
Axiom 3.6 (Independence of downstream benefits) For every pair of river problems
(N, e, b) and (N, e, b′) such that bj = (b′)j for all j ≤ i, we have that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e, b′).
Axiom 3.7 (Independence of upstream benefits) For every pair of river problems
(N, e, b) and (N, e, b′) such that bj = (b′)j for all j ≥ i, we have that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e, b′).
3Note that under increasing benefit functions we can write this inequality as fi(N, e, b) ≤ bi(
∑
i∈N ei)
for all i ∈ N .
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The next two independence axioms concern the inflows. The first one states that
the payoff of an agent does not depend on the inflows at the territories of its downstream
agents, the second one states that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the inflows
at the territories of its upstream agents.
Axiom 3.8 (Independence of downstream inflows) For every pair of river problems
(N, e, b) and (N, e′, b) such that ej = e′j for all j ≤ i, we have that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e′, b).
Axiom 3.9 (Independence of upstream inflows) For every pair of river problems (N, e, b)
and (N, e′, b) such that ej = e′j for all j ≥ i, we have that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e′, b).
As follows from the results in the following sections, not all the axioms stated in
this section can be satisfied simultaneously. In the next sections we show that different
sets of axioms characterize different fair welfare distributions.
4 The downstream incremental solution
The first result is that on the class WN of river problems (N, e, b) the downstream incre-
mental solution d, given by (2.4) and discussed in Section 2, is characterized by the four
axioms of efficiency, lower bound property, weak aspiration level property and independence
of downstream benefits.
Theorem 4.1 A solution f on the class WN of river problems is equal to the downstream
incremental solution d if and only if f satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, the
weak aspiration level property and independence of downstream benefits.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the downstream incremental solution satisfies
these four axioms. Hence, it is sufficient to show that the four axioms determine a unique
solution.
Let (N, e, b) ∈ WN be a river problem and suppose that solution f satisfies the four
axioms. We prove uniqueness by induction on the labels of the agents, starting with the
most upstream agent 1. We first show that f1(N, e, b) is uniquely determined by the four
axioms. Consider the modified river problem (N, e, b1) given by benefit functions (b1)1 = b1,
and (b1)j(x) = 0 for all x ∈ IR+ and j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Imposing the lower bound property
on (N, e, b1) requires that fj(N, e, b
1) ≥ (b1)j(0) = 0 for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, while the weak
aspiration level property requires that fj(N, e, b
1) ≤ maxxj≤∑k∈N ek (b1)j(xj) = 0 for all j ∈
{2, . . . , n}. Hence, fj(N, e, b1) = 0 for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. By efficiency we then have that
f1(N, e, b
1) = vn(e, b1) being the welfare level at the solution of the maximization problem
(2.2) for (N, e, b1). Since (b1)j(x) = 0 for every x ∈ IR+ and j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, it follows that
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vn(e, b1) = v1(e, b1) = maxx1≤e1(b
1)1(x1) = maxx1≤e1 b1(x1) = v
1(e, b). Independence of
downstream benefits then implies that f1(N, e, b) = f1(N, e, b
1) = v1(e, b) = d1(N, e, b).
Proceeding by induction, assume that fk(N, e, b) = dk(N, e, b) for all k < i ≤ n.
Next, consider the modified river problem (N, e, bi) given by (bi)j = bj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i}
and (bi)j(x) = 0 for all x ∈ IR+ and j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}. Similar as above, the lower bound
property requires that fj(N, e, b
i) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}, while the weak aspiration
level property requires that fj(N, e, b
i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}. Thus
fj(N, e, b
i) = 0 for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}. (4.5)
Independence of downstream benefits and the induction hypothesis imply that fj(N, e, b
i) =
fj(N, e, b) = dj(N, e, b) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. Hence,
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e, b
i) =
i−1∑
j=1
dj(N, e, b) = v
i−1(e, b). (4.6)
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (4.5) and (4.6) then determine that
fi(N, e, b
i) = vn(e, bi)−
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e, b
i)−
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e, b
i) = vn(e, bi)− vi−1(e, b). (4.7)
Since (bi)j(x) = 0 for every x ∈ IR+ and j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n}, similar as above it follows
that vn(e, bi) = vi(e, bi) = vi(e, b). Therefore, with (4.7) we have fi(N, e, b
i) = vn(e, bi) −
vi−1(e, b) = vi(e, b)− vi−1(e, b) = di(N, e, b). Finally, independence of downstream benefits
implies that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e, b
i) = di(N, e, b). 2
Logical independence of the axioms used in Theorem 4.1 and in the characteriza-
tions in the following sections, is shown in the appendix. Notice that the solution is fully
determined by the welfare levels obtained by solving the welfare maximization problems
(2.3) and that these problems are well-defined when the benefit functions satisfy Assump-
tion 2.1. Therefore we do not need to make any additional assumption concerning agents
with concave, but not strictly concave, benefit functions.
5 The upstream incremental solution
As noticed in Section 2, the aspiration level property puts an upper bound on the total
payoff to the members of an upstream coalition {1, . . . , j}, j = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, ac-
cording to the downstream incremental solution all gains in benefits that occur when some
of the inflows at the territories of an upstream coalition {1, . . . , j} are allocated to its
downstream agents i, i > j, go to the downstream agents in the sense that the upstream
coalition is only compensated for its loss of total benefit. Alternatively, van den Brink, van
11
der Laan and Vasil’ev (2007) introduced the upstream incremental solution. According
to this solution all gains in benefits that occur when some of the inflows at the territo-
ries of an upstream coalition {1, . . . , j} are allocated to its downstream agents i, i > j,
go to the upstream agents in the sense that the total payoff to the downstream coalition
{j + 1, . . . , n} is just equal to the total benefit they can achieve by allocating their own
inflows optimally amongst themselves. In van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2010)
a class of so-called TIBS-fairness axioms is introduced that, together with efficiency, yield
the downstream incremental solution and the upstream incremental solution as extreme
cases.
To define the upstream incremental solution, we consider for every j = 1, . . . , n, the
welfare maximization problem
max
xj ,...,xn
n∑
i=j
bi(xi) s.t.
k∑
i=j
xi ≤
k∑
i=j
ei, k = j, . . . , n, and xi ≥ 0, i = j, . . . , n, (5.8)
i.e., for agent j the maximization problem (5.8) optimally allocates the inflows ej, . . . , en
amongst the agents in the coalition {j, j + 1, . . . , n}, given the uni-directionality of the
water flow. Under Assumption 2.1, these maximization problems do not have a unique
solution but are well-defined. For a solution yj = (yjj , . . . , y
j
n) of maximization problem
(5.8) for agent j, denote wj(e, b) =
∑n
i=j bi(y
j
i ) as the maximum welfare that the agents
in {j, j + 1, . . . , n} can obtain by distributing their own inflows. Notice that for j = 1
the maximization problem (5.8) is equal to problem (2.2), so that w1(e, b) = vn(e, b) is the
maximum total benefit that can be obtained when allocating all inflows optimally amongst
all agents. For every solution y1 of (5.8), the budget balanced pair (y1, t) yields a welfare
distribution
zi = bi(y
1
i ) + ti, i = 1, . . . , n,
with sum of payoffs equal to the Pareto efficient total welfare w1(e, b) =
∑n
i=1 bi(y
1
i ).
The upstream incremental solution assigns to every agent i its marginal contribution
to the welfare when the agents enter subsequently from the most downstream agent to the
most upstream agent. Hence, the upstream incremental solution assigns to every river
situation (N, e, b), the welfare distribution u(N, e, b) ∈ IRn given by
ui(N, e, b) = w
i(e, b)− wi+1(e, b), i = 1, . . . , n,
with wn+1(e, b) = 0.
The next theorem states that on the class WN of river problems (N, e, b) the up-
stream incremental solution u is characterized by the four axioms of efficiency, lower bound
property, drought property and independence of upstream inflows.
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Theorem 5.1 A solution f on the class WN of river problems is equal to the upstream
incremental solution u if and only if f satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, the
drought property and independence of upstream inflows.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the upstream incremental solution satisfies these
four axioms. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that the four axioms determine a unique
solution.
Let (N, e, b) ∈ WN be a river problem and suppose that solution f satisfies the four
axioms. We apply induction on the labels of the agents, starting with the most downstream
agent n. We first consider fn(N, e, b). Consider the modified river problem (N, e
n, b) given
by (en)n = en, and (e
n)j = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. The lower bound property requires
that fj(N, e
n, b) ≥ bj(0) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, while the drought property requires that
fj(N, e
n, b) ≤ bj(0) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Thus, we conclude that fj(N, en, b) = bj(0)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. By efficiency we then have that
fn(N, e
n, b) = w1(en, b)−
n−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e, b) = w
1(en, b)−
n−1∑
j=1
bj(0). (5.9)
Since enj = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} and enn = en, it follows that w1(en, b) =
∑n−1
j=1 bj(0)+
wn(en, b) =
∑n−1
j=1 bj(0) + w
n(e, b), and thus with (5.9) we have fn(N, e
n, b) = wn(e, b).
Independence of upstream inflows then implies that fn(N, e, b) = fn(N, e
n, b) = wn(e, b) =
un(N, e, b).
Proceeding by induction, assume that fk(N, e, b) = uk(N, e, b) is determined for all
k > i ≥ 1. Next, consider the modified river problem (N, ei, b) given by (ei)j = ej for all
j ∈ {i, . . . n}, and (ei)j = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}. Similar as above, the lower bound
property requires that fj(N, e
i, b) ≥ bj(0) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}, while the drought
property requires that fj(N, e
i, b) ≤ bj(0) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. Thus,
fj(N, e
i, b) = bj(0) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. (5.10)
Independence of upstream inflows and the induction hypothesis imply that fj(N, e
i, b) =
fj(N, e, b) = uj(N, e, b) for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}. Hence,
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e
i, b) =
n∑
j=i+1
uj(N, e, b) = w
i+1(e, b). (5.11)
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (5.10) and (5.11) then determine that
fi(N, e
i, b) = w1(ei, b)−
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e
i, b)−
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e
i, b)
= w1(ei, b)−
i−1∑
j=1
bj(0)− wi+1(e, b). (5.12)
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Since eij = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} and eij = ej for all j ∈ {i, . . . n}, similar as above it
follows that w1(ei, b) =
∑i−1
j=1 bj(0) + w
i(ei, b) =
∑i−1
j=1 bj(0) + w
i(e, b). Thus, with (5.12)
we have fi(N, e
i, b) = w1(ei, b)−∑i−1j=1 bj(0)−wi+1(e, b) = wi(e, b)−wi+1(e, b) = ui(N, e, b).
Finally, independence of downstream benefits implies that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e
i, b) =
ui(N, e, b). 2
Notice that the solution is fully determined by the welfare levels obtained by solving
the welfare maximization problems (5.8). Hence, by definition the upstream incremental
solution satisfies stability for every downstream coalition {i, i + 1 . . . , n}. Like the down-
stream incremental solution, it also satisfies the stability requirement for every coalition of
consecutive agents, see for instance van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil’ev (2007).
6 The downstream solution
As mentioned in the previous sections, both the downstream and the upstream incremental
solution satisfy stability for every coalition of consecutive countries, and so they both meet
the Harmon doctrine saying that every agent is the legal owner of its own water inflow.
Under the Harmon doctrine the downstream incremental solution favors the downstream
agents as much as possible. The upstream incremental solution is more in favor of the
upstream agents.
As discussed in Section 2, the Harmon doctrine is conflicting with the TIBS principle
which makes all countries together the legal owner of all water inflows. For example,
according to the TIBS principle all agents are entitled to get a share of the water inflow
e1 at the territory of agent 1. Taking the TIBS principle in its most extreme form, one
might argue that the most downstream agent is entitled to receive all the water inflows.
Under this condition, the upstream agents can ‘buy’ water by compensating the most
downstream agent for its loss of water. Taking this viewpoint on water rights, we define
the downstream solution s, which assigns to a river situation (N, e, b) ∈ WN the welfare
distribution s(N, e, b) given by
si(N, e, b) = ŵ
i(e, b)− ŵi+1(e, b), i = 1, . . . , n,
where ŵn+1(e, b) = 0 and ŵj(e, b) =
∑n
i=j bi(y
j
i ), j = 1, . . . , n, with y
j = (yjj , . . . , y
j
n) a
solution of the welfare maximization problem
max
xj ,...,xn
n∑
i=j
bi(xi) s.t.
k∑
i=j
xi ≤
k∑
i=1
ei, k = j, . . . , n, and xi ≥ 0, i = j, . . . , n. (6.13)
Notice the difference between the maximization problems (6.13) and (5.8). In (5.8) the
agents in a downstream coalition {j, j+1, . . . , n} can only consume their own water inflow,
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while in (6.13) they can use their own water inflows and also all the water inflows at
the territories of all agents upstream of j. Then, for a coalition {j, j + 1, . . . , n} the
maximization problem (6.13) optimally allocates the inflows e1, . . . , en amongst the agents
in the coalition, given the uni-directionality of the water flow. Notice that for j = 1 the
maximization problem (6.13) is again equal to problem (2.2), so that ŵ1(e, b) = vn(e, b)
is the maximum total benefit that can be obtained when allocating all inflows optimally
amongst all agents. Since
∑n
i=1 si(N, e, b) = ŵ
1(e, b) = vn(e, b), also the downstream
solution distributes the maximum attainable total welfare that the agents can achieve
together and thus also this solution is efficient.
It turns out that the downstream solution can be characterized similarly as the
downstream incremental solution in Theorem 4.1, but now the independence of downstream
benefits is replaced by independence of upstream benefits.4
Theorem 6.1 A solution f on the class WN of river problems is equal to the downstream
solution s if and only if f satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, the weak aspiration
level property and independence of upstream benefits.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove that the downstream solution satisfies these four
axioms. Therefore, it only remains to prove that the four axioms determine a unique
solution.
Let (N, e, b) ∈ WN be a river problem and suppose that solution f satisfies the
four axioms. Similar as in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we apply induction on the labels of
the agents, starting with the most downstream agent n. We first determine fn(N, e, b).
Consider the modified river problem (N, e, bn) given by (bn)n = bn, and (b
n)j(x) = 0 for
all x ∈ IR+ and j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. The lower bound property requires that fj(N, e, bn) ≥
(bn)j(0) = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, while the weak aspiration level property requires
that
fj(N, e, b
n) ≤ max
xj≤
∑
k∈N ek
(bn)j(xj) = 0, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Thus, we conclude that fj(N, e, b
n) = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. By efficiency we then
have that
fn(N, e, b
n) = vn(e, bn) = ŵ1(e, bn). (6.14)
4For the auction games of Graham, Marshall and Richard (1990), it is shown in van den Brink (2004)
that, together with efficiency and symmetry, independence of higher valuations characterizes the Shapley
value, while independence of lower valuations characterizes the equal division solution. In bankruptcy or
rationing problems independence on higher claims is used to characterize the constrained equal awards
rule, while independence on lower claims is used to characterize the constrained equal losses rule, see e.g.
Moulin (2003).
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Since (bn)j(x) = 0 for every x ∈ IR+ and j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, and (bn)n = bn, it follows
that ŵ1(e, bn) = ŵn(e, bn) = ŵn(e, b) and thus, with (6.14), fn(N, e, b
n) = ŵ1(e, bn) =
ŵn(e, b) = sn(N, e, b). Independence of upstream benefits then implies that fn(N, e, b) =
fn(N, e, b
n) = sn(N, e, b).
Proceeding by induction, assume that fk(N, e, b) = sk(N, e, b) for all k > i ≥ 1.
Next, consider the modified river problem (N, e, bi) given by (bi)j = bj for all j ∈ {i, . . . , n},
and (bi)j(x) = 0 for all x ∈ IR+ and j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. Similar as above, the lower bound
property requires that fj(N, e, b
i) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}, while weak aspiration level
fairness requires that fj(N, e, b
i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. Thus,
fj(N, e, b
i) = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}. (6.15)
Independence of upstream benefits and the induction hypothesis imply that fj(N, e, b
i) =
fj(N, e, b) = sj(N, e, b) for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}. Therefore,
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e, b
i) =
n∑
j=i+1
sj(N, e, b) = ŵ
i+1(e, b). (6.16)
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (6.15) and (6.16) then determine that
fi(N, e, b
i) = ŵ1(e, bi)−
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e, b
i)−
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e, b
i) = ŵ1(e, bi)− ŵi+1(e, b). (6.17)
Since (bi)j(x) = 0 for every x ∈ IR+ and j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}, and (bi)j = bj for all j ≥ i,
similar as above it follows that ŵ1(e, bi) = ŵi(e, bi) = ŵi(e, b). Hence, with (6.17) we have
fi(N, e, b
i) = ŵ1(e, bi)−ŵi+1(e, b) = ŵi(e, b)−ŵi+1(e, b) = si(N, e, b). Finally, independence
of upstream benefits implies that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e, b
i) = si(N, e, b). 2
Note that in the welfare maximization problems (6.13), the agents in the downstream
coalition {j, . . . , n} are entitled to get the total water inflow ∑i∈N ei. When some of
the water is allocated to other agents, according to the downstream solution the most
downstream agent is fully compensated for his loss of benefits by monetary compensations
of the other agents. This is an extreme interpretation of the TIBS principle. Consequently,
the downstream solution does not satisfy upstream stability and thus violates the Harmon
doctrine: clearly all water rights are given to the most downstream agent.
7 The upstream solution
As noticed in the previous section, the upstream incremental solution favors the upstream
agents as much as possible under the restriction of stability for the downstream coalitions.
As counterpart of the downstream solution, in this section we introduce the upstream
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solution r that favors the upstream agents as much as possible given the uni-directionality
of the water flows. It takes the Harmon principle in its most extreme form by requiring
that the agents from upstream to downstream receive the highest attainable additional
benefit from their water inflows given that the inflows of their upstream agents have been
distributed already.
To define the upstream solution, we first reconsider the welfare distribution ac-
cording to the upstream incremental solution. This solution yields a payoff un(N, e, b) =
wn(e, b) to the last agent n, where wn(e, b) is the highest benefit that agent n can achieve
from the consumption of only his own water inflow. Then agent n−1 receives un−1(N, e, b) =
wn−1(e, b) − wn(e, b), where wn−1(e, b) is the total benefit that agents n − 1 and n can
jointly achieve by distributing their own water optimally. In this way agent n− 1 receives
its marginal contribution to the total benefit of his water inflow en−1 to the water inflow
en, taking all the upstream inflows equal to zero. In general, agent i receives his marginal
contribution to the total benefit of his water inflow ei to the downstream inflows ej, j > i,
taking all the upstream inflows ej, j < i, equal to zero.
Similar to the upstream incremental solution, the upstream solution can be defined
the other way around, starting with agent 1. When all inflows are zero, every agent has
payoff bi(0), i = 1, . . . , n. Now, let the most upstream inflow e1 be distributed optimally
amongst all agents. Then agent 1 receives in addition to b1(0) a payoff equal to the marginal
contribution to the total benefit when distributing his inflow e1 optimally amongst all other
agents and assuming all other inflows to be equal to zero, i.e., the upstream solution r yields
to agent 1 payoff r1(N, e, b, ) = v̂
1(e, b), where
v̂1(e, b) = b1(0) +
n∑
j=1
(bj(y
1
j )− bj(0)) = b1(y11) +
n∑
j=2
(bj(y
1
j )− bj(0)),
with y1 = (y11, . . . , y
1
n) a solution of the welfare maximization problem
max
x1,...,xn
n∑
j=1
bj(xj) s.t.
n∑
j=1
xj ≤ e1, xj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
Next, the inflows e1 and e2 are distributed optimally over all agents assuming all other
inflows to be equal to zero, and agent 2 receives his initial payoff b2(0) plus the additional
total benefit that the distribution of his inflow e2 generates to the benefits obtained already
from e1. Subsequently, for agent i all inflows ej, j ≤ i, are distributed optimally over all
agents assuming all inflows of the downstream agents j > i to be equal to zero, and agent
i receives his initial payoff bi(0) plus the additional total benefit that the distribution of
his inflow ei generates to the benefit obtained already from e1 to ei−1. In general, the
upstream solution r assigns to a river situation (N, e, b) ∈ WN the welfare distribution
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r(N, e, b) given by
ri(N, e, b) = v̂
i(e, b)− v̂i−1(e, b), i = 1, . . . , n,
where v̂0(e, b) = 0 and v̂i(e, b) =
∑i
j=1 bj(y
i
j) +
∑n
j=i+1 (bj(y
i
j)− bj(0)), i = 1, . . . , n, with
yi = (yi1, . . . , y
i
n) a solution of the welfare maximization problem
max
x1,...,xn
n∑
j=1
bj(xj) s.t.

∑n
j=1 xj ≤
∑i
j=1 ej,∑k
j=1 xj ≤
∑k
j=1 ej, k = 1, . . . , i− 1,
xj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
(7.18)
Observe that this maximization problem optimally distributes the water inflow of the
agents in {1, . . . , i} over all agents, taking into account that for every agent k < i the total
consumption of the first k agents is at most equal to the sum of their own inflows. The
payoffs of the welfare distribution r(N, e, b) can also be written as
ri(N, e, b) = v̂
i(e, b)− v̂i−1(e, b)
=
i∑
j=1
bj(y
i
j) +
n∑
j=i+1
(bj(y
i
j)− bj(0))−
(
i−1∑
j=1
bj(y
i−1
j ) +
n∑
j=i
(bj(y
i−1
j )− bj(0))
)
= bi(0) +
n∑
j=1
(bj(y
i
j)− bj(yi−1j )), i = 1, . . . , n.
For j = n, the maximization problem (7.18) is again equal to problem (2.2), so that
v̂n(e, b) = vn(e, b) is the maximum total benefit that can be obtained when allocating all
inflows optimally amongst all agents. Since
∑n
i=1 ri(N, e, b) = v̂
n(e, b) = vn(e, b), also the
upstream solution distributes the maximum attainable total welfare that the agents can
achieve together, and thus also this solution is efficient. It turns out that the upstream
solution can be characterized similarly as the upstream incremental solution by means
of efficiency and the lower bound property, but now the drought property is changed for
the no contribution property and the independence of upstream inflows is replaced by
independence of downstream inflows.
Theorem 7.1 A solution f on the class WN of river problems is equal to the upstream
solution r if and only if f satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, the no contribution
property and independence of downstream inflows.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the upstream solution satisfies these four axioms.
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that the four axioms determine a unique solution.
Let (N, e, b) ∈ WN be a river problem and suppose that solution f satisfies the four
axioms. Similar as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we apply induction on the labels of the
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agents, starting with the most upstream agent 1. We first determine f1(N, e, b). Consider
the modified river problem (N, e1, b) given by (e1)1 = e1, and (e
1)j = 0 for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
The lower bound property requires that fj(N, e
1, b) ≥ bj(0) for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, while
the no contribution property requires that fj(N, e
1, b) ≤ bj(0) for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Thus,
we conclude that fj(N, e
1, b) = bj(0) for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. By efficiency we then have that
f1(N, e
1, b) = vn(e1, b) −∑nj=2 fj(N, e1, b) = vn(e1, b) −∑nj=2 bj(0). Since e1j = 0 for all
j ∈ {2, . . . , n} and e11 = e1, it follows that vn(e1, b) =
∑n
j=1 bj(y
1
j ) = v̂
1(e, b) +
∑n
j=2 bj(0),
and thus f1(N, e
1, b) = v̂1(e, b) +
∑n
j=2 bj(0) −
∑n
j=2 bj(0) = v̂
1(e, b). Independence of
downstream inflows then implies that f1(N, e, b) = f1(N, e
1, b) = v̂1(e, b) = v̂1(e, b) −
v̂0(e, b) = r1(N, e, b).
Proceeding by induction, assume that fk(N, e, b) = rk(N, e, b) is determined for all
k < i ≤ n. Next, consider the modified river problem (N, ei, b) given by (ei)j = ej for
all j ∈ {1, ..., i} and (ei)j = 0 for all j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n}. Similar as above, the lower
bound property requires that fj(N, e
i, b) ≥ bj(0) for all j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n}, while the no
contribution property requires that fj(N, e
i, b) ≤ bj(0) for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}. Thus,
fj(N, e
i, b) = bj(0) for all j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}. (7.19)
Independence of downstream inflows and the induction hypothesis imply that fj(N, e
i, b) =
fj(N, e, b) = rj(N, e, b) for all j ∈ {1, ..., i− 1}. Therefore,
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e
i, b) =
i−1∑
j=1
rj(N, e, b) =
i−1∑
j=1
[v̂j(e, b)− v̂j−1(e, b)] = v̂i−1(e, b). (7.20)
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (7.19) and (7.20) then determine that
fi(N, e
i, b) = vn(ei, b)−
i−1∑
j=1
fj(N, e, b)−
n∑
j=i+1
fj(N, e, b)
= vn(ei, b)− v̂i−1(e, b)−
n∑
j=i+1
bj(0). (7.21)
Since eij = 0 for all j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n} and eij = ej for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, similar as above
it follows that vn(ei, b) =
∑n
j=1 bj(y
i
j) = v̂
i(e, b) +
∑n
j=i+1 bj(0). Thus, with (7.21) we
have fi(N, e
i, b) = v̂i(e, b)+
∑n
j=i+1 bj(0)− v̂i−1(e, b)−
∑n
j=i+1 bj(0) = v̂
i(e, b)− v̂i−1(e, b) =
ri(N, e, b). Finally, independence of downstream inflows implies that fi(N, e, b) = fi(N, e
i, b) =
ri(N, e, b). 2
According to the upstream solution, every upstream coalition {1, . . . , j} receives
the total welfare that can be attained by allocating the water inflows of such a coalition
optimally over all agents. Clearly, the welfare at a solution of the corresponding welfare
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maximization problem (7.18) is at least as high as the welfare at a solution of the corre-
sponding welfare maximization problem (2.3) in which the inflows of a coalition {1, . . . , j}
are distributed optimally amongst themselves. So, the upstream solution certainly satis-
fies stability for the upstream coalitions and thus satisfies the Harmon principle for the
upstream coalitions. However, the upstream solution does not satisfy stability in general.
For example, agent n receives the marginal benefit v̂n(e, b)− v̂n−1(e, b), being the difference
between the total benefit of the water consumptions yn and yn−1. Nothing can be said
about this difference and the benefit bn(en) that agent n can obtain by consuming his own
water. Therefore, it might happen that rn(N, e, b) < bn(en), violating individual rational-
ity and thus stability.5 However, we could say that for every coalition {i, i + 1, . . . , j} of
consecutive agents the upstream solution reflects a weaker form of the Harmon principle
in the sense that such a coalition receives as much as possible under the restriction that
the total payoff to its upstream coalition {1, . . . , i − 1} is equal to the highest attainable
total welfare of all countries that can be achieved by allocating their inflows e1, . . . , ei−1
amongst all countries.
8 A special case: the claims model
In this section we consider the particular case that every country has constant marginal
benefit of one up to its satiation point ci and has constant benefit of every water consump-
tion above its satiation point, i.e., for every i there exists a ci > 0 such that
bi(xi) =
{
xi if xi ≤ ci
ci if xi > ci.
(8.22)
Such benefit functions have been considered in Ansink and Weikard (2011) within river
situations in which it is not allowed or possible to make monetary transfers. In such a
model the satiation point ci can be considered as the claim of country i for water and
the problem is to find, without monetary compensations, a fair distribution of the water
inflows amongst the countries given their claims and the uni-directionality of the water
flows. We now consider the four solutions in case of such benefit functions within the
model considered in this paper, allowing for monetary compensations.
Recall that the downstream incremental solution d is given by
dj(N, e, b) = v
j(e, b)− vj−1(e, b), j = 1, . . . , n, (8.23)
5Note that the definition of stability is based on the game theoretical model proposed in Ambec and
Sprumont (2002). This model is a thought experiment to study the allocation problem at hand that takes
into account the Harmon principle. A different model could be proposed taking into account the TIBS
principle and/or the UTI principle, which would lead to stability of the upstream solution.
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where v0(e, b) = 0 and vj(e, b) is the welfare at a solution of the welfare maximization
problem (2.3) for agent j. For benefit functions of type (8.22) it follows straightforwardly
that
v1(e, b) = min[c1, e1],
and successively
vj(e, b) = vj−1(e, b) + min[cj,
j∑
i=1
ei − vj−1(e, b)], j = 2, . . . , n.
Substituting this in the equations (8.23) we obtain
d1(N, e, b) = min[c1, e1]
and, for j = 2, . . . , n, recursively,
dj(N, e, b) = min
[
cj, ej +
j−1∑
i=1
(ei − di(N, e, b))
]
,
using the fact that by definition
∑j−1
i=1 di(N, e, b) = v
j−1(e, b), j = 2, . . . , n. This down-
stream incremental solution can be implemented by assigning to each upstream coalition
{1, . . . , j} as much water as possible given the uni-directionality of the water flows and
under the constraint that no country gets water above its satiation point. We conclude
that, when each country has a benefit function of type (8.22), monetary compensations are
not needed to implement the downstream incremental solution.
Recall that the downstream solution s is given by
sj(N, e, b) = ŵ
j(e, b)− ŵj+1(e, b), j = 1, . . . , n, (8.24)
where ŵn+1(e, b) = 0 and ŵj(e, b) is the welfare at a solution of the welfare maximization
problem (6.13) for agent j. To avoid notational burden, in the following we assume, without
loss of generality, that
∑n
i=j ei <
∑n
i=j ci for every j = 1, . . . , n. Suppose this does not
hold for j = n. Then en ≥ cn and the water inflow at agent n is at least as high as his
satiation point. Then this country does not need to get water from his upstream countries.
Because also his excess en − cn of water cannot be assigned to his upstream countries,
in this case country n stands alone and does not affect the welfare of the other agents.
Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the agents 1, . . . , n − 1. Similarly, suppose that the
condition holds for all agents i > j and not for agent j. Then ej ≥ cj +
∑n
i=j+1(ci − ei)
and the water inflow at agent j is high enough to assign agent j and all its downstream
agents water up to their satiation points, and so the water consumptions of these agents
do not affect the upstream agents. In this case, we have to solve two independent water
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distribution problems, one for the upstream coalition {1, . . . , j − 1} and the other for the
downstream coalition {j, . . . , n}. Therefore, the assumption can be made without loss of
generality. Under this assumption it follows straightforwardly that for benefit functions of
type (8.22)
ŵn(e, b) = min[cn,
n∑
i=1
ei].
By the above assumption we have that ŵn(e, b) ≥ en and then
ŵn−1(e, b) = ŵn(e, b) + min[cn−1,
n∑
i=1
ei − ŵn(e, b)],
and again by the assumption we have that ŵn−1(e, b) ≥ en−1 + en. Continuing, it follows
successively from j = n− 2 to j = 1 that
ŵj(e, b) = ŵj+1(e, b) + min[cj,
n∑
i=1
ei − ŵj+1(e, b)].
Substituting this in the equations (8.24) we obtain
sn(N, e, b) = min[cn,
n∑
i=1
ei]
and, recursively from j = n− 1 to j = 1,
sj(N, e, b) = min[cj,
n∑
j=1
ej −
n∑
i=j+1
si(N, e, b))],
using the fact that by definition
∑n
i=j+1 si(N, e, b) = ŵ
j+1(e, b), j = 1, . . . , n − 1. From
these expressions it follows that the downstream solution can be implemented by assign-
ing to each downstream coalition {j, . . . , n} as much water as possible given the uni-
directionality of the water flows and under the constraint that no country gets water above
its satiation point. Again, when each country has a benefit function of type (8.22), mon-
etary compensations are not needed to implement the downstream solution and thus the
downstream solution also can be implemented when monetary compensations cannot be
made.
Recall that the upstream incremental solution u is given by
uj(N, e, b) = w
j(e, b)− wj+1(e, b), j = 1, . . . , n, (8.25)
where wn+1(e, b) = 0 and wj(e, b) is the welfare at a solution of the welfare maximization
problem (5.8) for agent j. Again, without loss of generality we assume that
∑n
i=j ei <
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∑n
i=j ci for every j = 1, . . . , n. For benefit functions of type (8.22) it then follows straight-
forwardly that
wj(e, b) =
n∑
i=j
ei, j = 1, . . . , n
and substituting this in the equations (8.25) we obtain
uj(N, e, b) =
n∑
i=j
ei −
n∑
i=j+1
ei = ej, j = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, the upstream incremental solution gives precisely payoff ej to each country j.
Clearly, it might be possible that this cannot be implemented without monetary transfers.
For example, take n = 2, c1 < e1 < c1 + c2 and e2 = 0. The total welfare e1 is obtained
for every solution x∗ of the welfare maximization problem (2.2), thus for every x∗ with
max[0, e1 − c2] ≤ x∗1 ≤ c1 and x∗2 = e1 − x∗1. Thus, to implement the welfare distribution
u(N, e, b) = (e1, 0)
> ∈ IR2+ it is required that agent 2 pays a monetary compensation t = x∗2
to agent 1 since by only consuming water, agent 1 cannot reach a higher payoff than
c1 < e1. We conclude that in general the upstream incremental solution cannot be applied
when monetary compensations are not allowed or not possible. However, notice that when
ei ≤ ci for all i, then the downstream incremental solution reduces to dj(N, e, b) = ej for
all j, and thus the downstream incremental and upstream incremental solution coincide.
Finally, recall that the upstream solution r given by
rj(N, e, b) = v̂
j(e, b)− v̂j−1(e, b), j = 1, . . . , n, (8.26)
where v̂0(e, b) = 0 and v̂j(e, b) is obtained from a solution of the welfare maximization
problem (7.18) for agent j. Again under the assumption that
∑n
i=j ei <
∑n
i=j ci for every
j = 1, . . . , n, it follows straightforwardly that
v̂j(e, b) =
j∑
i=1
ei, j = 1, . . . , n
and substituting this in the equations (8.26) we obtain
rj(N, e, b) =
j∑
i=1
ei −
j−1∑
i=1
ei = ej, j = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore, the upstream solution and the upstream incremental solution coincide and thus
in general the upstream solution cannot be applied when monetary compensations are not
allowed or not possible.
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9 Comparison of the four solutions and concluding
remarks
In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water among agents located along a river.
We adapted the model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) by weakening the assumption on
the benefit functions of the agents. Using nine different axioms we were able to characterize
four solutions for this model. The downstream incremental solution, originally suggested by
Ambec and Sprumont (2002), can be characterized by efficiency, the lower bound property,
the weak aspiration level property and independence of downstream benefits. The upstream
incremental solution, originally suggested by van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil’ev
(2007), can be characterized by efficiency, the lower bound property, the drought property
and independence of upstream inflows. The new downstream solution can be characterized
by efficiency, the lower bound property, the weak aspiration property and independence
of upstream benefits, and the new upstream solution can be characterized by efficiency,
the lower bound property, the no contribution property and independence of downstream
inflows.
The taxonomy is shown in Table 9.1 (where, for every solution, the four boldface
‘yes’ give an axiomatization of the solution).
Solution: downstream incr. upstream incr. downstream upstream
Axiom:
efficiency yes yes yes yes
lower bound yes yes yes yes
drought yes yes yes yes
weak aspiration yes no yes no
no contribution no yes no yes
downstream benefits yes no no no
upstream benefits no yes yes no
upstream inflows no yes no no
downstream inflows yes no no yes
Table 9.1 Table of axioms satisfied by the four solutions.
Notice from this table that none of the four solutions satisfies simultaneously the
weak aspiration level property and independence of upstream inflows. Similarly none of the
four solutions satisfies simultaneously the no contribution property and the independence
of downstream benefits. Further, the independence of downstream benefits is only satisfied
by the incremental downstream solution and the independence of upstream inflows is only
satisfied by the incremental upstream solution. Thus, if the countries along an international
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river agree to impose one of these properties, then it selects a unique solution out of the
four solutions presented in this paper and therefore also provides the countries with a
compensation scheme.
From the selected axioms it follows that independence of downstream benefits gives
lower compensations to the upstream countries than the independence of upstream inflows.
The two other independence properties are satisfied by two solutions (one extreme and one
incremental solution). The independence of upstream benefits is satisfied by the down-
stream solution and the upstream incremental solution, the independence of downstream
inflows is satisfied by the upstream solution and the downstream incremental solution.
Finally, when we apply the four solutions to the particular case that every agent
has constant marginal benefit of one up to a satiation point and marginal benefit of zero
thereafter, only the downstream and downstream incremental solutions can be implemented
without monetary transfers between the agents. This means that when countries along an
international river only state a claim on the river water and are not willing to transfer
money to each other, out of the four solutions presented in this paper only these two
solutions are viable.
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Appendix: Logical independence
In this appendix we show logical independence of the axioms in the four axiomatizations
by, for each axiomatization, giving four alternative solutions, each of these solutions only
satisfying three of the four axioms.
The axioms of Theorem 4.1
1. The solution fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈ N and all river problems (N, e, b) satisfies
the lower bound property, the weak aspiration level property, and independence of
downstream benefits. It does not satisfy efficiency.
2. The solution fi(N, e, b) = maxxi≤
∑
j∈N ej bi(xi) for all i ∈ N \ {n}, and fn(N, e, b) =
vn(e, b)−∑n−1j=1 fi(N, e, b) assigns to every agent except the most downstream agent
its highest benefit when it would have access to all water inflows, while the benefit of
the most downstream agent is obtained by subtracting all these benefits from the total
benefit in an efficient allocation. It satisfies efficiency, independence of downstream
benefits, and the weak aspiration level property. It does not satisfy the lower bound
property.
3. The solution fn(N, e, b) = v
n(e, b) −∑n−1j=1 bi(0) and fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈
N\{n} satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, and independence of downstream
benefits. It does not satisfy the weak aspiration level property.
4. The downstream solution satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, and the weak
aspiration level property. It does not satisfy independence of downstream benefits.
The axioms of Theorem 5.1
1. The solution fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈ N satisfies the lower bound property,
the drought property, and independence of upstream inflows. It does not satisfy
efficiency.
2. For some  > 0, define the solution f as f(N, e, b) = u(N, e, b) if en = 0. Otherwise,
define f1(N, e, b) = u1(N, e, b) − , fi(N, e, b) = ui(N, e, b) for i = 2, . . . , n − 1 and
fn(N, e, b) = un(N, e, b) + . It is easily seen that f satisfies efficiency, the drought
property, and independence of upstream inflows since u satisfies these properties. It
does not satisfy the lower bound property.
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3. The solution f1(N, e, b) = w
1(e, b) −∑nj=2 bj(0) and fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈
N \ {1} satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, and independence of upstream
inflows. It does not satisfy the drought property.
4. The downstream incremental solution d satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property,
and the drought property. It does not satisfy independence of upstream inflows.
The axioms of Theorem 6.1
1. The solution assigning fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) to i, i = 1, . . . , n, satisfies the lower bound
property, the weak aspiration level property, and independence of upstream benefits.
It does not satisfy efficiency.
2. The solution fi(N, e, b) = maxxi≤
∑
j∈N ej bi(xi) for all i ∈ N \ {1}, and f1(N, e, b) =
vn(e, b)−∑nj=2 fi(N, e, b) assigns to every agent except the most upstream agent its
highest benefit when it would have access to all water inflows, while the benefit of
the most upstream agent is obtained by subtracting all these benefits from the total
benefit in an efficient allocation. This solution satisfies efficiency, independence of
upstream benefits, and the weak aspiration level property. It does not satisfy the
lower bound property.
3. The upstream incremental solution satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, and
independence of upstream benefits. It does not satisfy the weak aspiration level
property.
4. From Theorem 4.1 it follows that the downstream incremental solution satisfies effi-
ciency, the lower bound property, and the weak aspiration level property. It does not
satisfy independence of upstream benefits.
The axioms of Theorem 7.1
1. The solution fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈ N satisfies the lower bound property, the no
contribution property, and independence of downstream inflows. It does not satisfy
efficiency.
2. For some  > 0, define the solution f by f(N, e, b) = r(N, e, b) if e1 = 0. Otherwise,
define f1(N, e, b) = r1(N, e, b) + , fi(N, e, b) = ri(N, e, b) for i = 2, . . . , n − 1 and
fn(N, e, b) = rn(N, e, b)− . It is easily seen that f satisfies efficiency, the no contri-
bution property, and independence of upstream inflows. It does not satisfy the lower
bound property.
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3. The solution fi(N, e, b) = bi(0) for all i ∈ N\{n} and fn(N, e, b) = vn(e, b) −∑n−1
j=1 bj(0) satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, and independence of down-
stream inflows. It does not satisfy the no contribution property.
4. The upstream incremental solution u satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property,
and the no contribution property. It does not satisfy independence of downstream
inflows.
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